Sunday, February 27, 2011

Non doing vs Abstaining

The previous post explored the core significance of a preliminary understanding of an end to appreciate the nature of a Mitzva as a means to that desired end. Ralbag illustrates this principle clearly in Mitvat Issur Melacha through his careful distinction between not doing vs abstaining
 At first glance, the distinction between not doing craft and abstaining from craft seems semantic and trivial. Isn't not doing the same thing as abstaining? From a behavioral point of view, this is a good point. With Ralbag's emphasis on Toelet, meaning and benefit however, the distinction rings true.

To merely not do something is to practice arbitrary self denial and is to be condemned to failure. The overeater tries to not eat, the drinker tries to not drink, both rarely if ever succeed. To abstain is to have a superior purpose for the sake of which one chooses to avoid overindulgence in an enticing pleasurable activity. The successful dieter's non eating supports a health oriented lifestyle that justifies some loss of eating pleasure.

The principle applies with equal force to Issur Melacha. To attempt to simply not do melacha on Shabat is to engage in a futile battle of will, one that will succumb to the allure of weekend entertainment or 24/7 workstyles. To abstain from melacha is to refrain from melacha , precisely because one is aware of the superior benefit opened up by redirecting energy away from overindulgence in the material domain for the sake of involvement in superior domain of mind. Ralbag develops this idea in Toelet #10 and 11.

In Toelet 11 the Halachic aspect of Issur melacha alone is explored, therefore the Mitzva is formulated at the behavioral level in isolation-- to not do craft on the Shabbat. This behavioral aspect is the focus of the Lo Taaseh as it is presented in the pasuk “You shall not do any Craft". Lest the modern reader slip into the error of thinking that mitzvot can be understood at the behavioral level alone, Ralbag emphasises the need to review the toelet from the previous Toelet- #10.

התועלת הי״א היא במצוות. והוא מה שהזהירנו מעשות כל מלאכה ביום השבת. שנאמר ״לא תעשה כל מלאכה” וכבר בארנו התועלת המגיע מזאת המצוה במה שקדם
The 11th Toelet is in Mitzvot, this being that we are prohibited from doing all craft on the Shabbat day- as it says “You shall not do any Craft”. We have already explained the toelet which comes from this Mitzva in the previous section.

In Toelet 10 the end pursued by this non doing is explored via the aseh of Shevita-to abstain from craft on the seventh day. This abstention is rooted in the pasuk “six days shall you work and accomplish all your craft but the seventh day shall be a Shabbath dedicated to Hashem your God”.

התועלת העשירי הוא במצוות. והוא מה שצוה לשבות ממלאכה ביום השבת. שנאמר ״ששת ימים תעבד ועשית כל מלאכתך ויום השביעי שבתלה׳ אלהיך וגו,״. והנה התועלת בזאת המצוה הוא בדעות ובמדות.
The tenth benefit is in Mitzvot this being that we are commanded to abstain from melacha on the Shabbat day as it says "six days shall you work and accomplish all your craft but the seventh day shall be a  Shabbath dedicated to Hashem your God". The benefit from this Mitzva is in theoretical ideas and practical affairs.

Clearly it is our insight into the toelet, benefit and meaning, of Shabbat in theoretical ideas and practical affairs that justifies abstaining from the allure of preoccupation with melacha alone.
But what is this insight that transforms Issur Melacha from a futile non doing into a productive abstention from overindulgence?

29 comments:

Anonymous said...
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Hagyan said...

How does the Ralbag System read a meaning of logical type מצווה from שמות כ/ט?

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Hello Hagyan!

Ralbag divides all mitzvot into means to the 10 archetypes of Toelet indicated by the dibrot. These 10 reduce to two essential kinds- middot(practical justice) and deot (Theoretical truth).

I assume by "logical type" mitzvot you mean what the Ralbag calls Deot or theoretical truth?

Hagyan said...

> Hello Hagyan!

Hi.

> Ralbag divides all mitzvot into means to the 10 archetypes of Toelet indicated by the dibrot. These 10 reduce to two essential kinds-middot(practical justice) and deot (Theoretical truth).

At the moment I don't see how to relate this remark to 'reading'.

> I assume by "logical type" mitzvot you mean what the Ralbag calls Deot or theoretical truth?

No. Sorry I don't have a more effective terminology here. (Perhaps recall previous conversations we've had about Gedankenexperimenten.) I meant:
1- Reading produces reactions in the soul of the reader.
2- For example, successfully reading a declarative non-fiction sentence might produce reactions in my soul that I logically interpret as a possible past or present state-of-affairs among some entities. In this case the 'logical types' involved might include entity-ness, inter-entity interactions, etc.
3- There is a distinct reaction which might be called "self-evident rational imperative" whose 'logical type' is מצווה.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Is "logical type mitzva" the sort of reaction of soul that an ordinary citizen can identify in himself?

Hagyan said...

>Is "logical type mitzva" the sort of reaction of soul that an ordinary citizen can identify in himself?

"
ונקדשתי, בתוך בני ישראל
"
ויקרא כב/לב

I think it would usually be hardest in חוקים like שבת.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Kiddush Hashem seems to be a highly specialized case, not an illustration of a simple case of Mitzva identification. Why do you use that as the example?

הציווי שנצטווינו על קדוש השם, והוא אמרו:
"ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל" (ויקרא כב, לב). ועניין מצווה זו:
שאנו מצווים לפרסם דת אמת זו ברבים, ושלא נירא בכך מהזק שום מזיק, עד שאפילו יבוא אלינו אנס עריץ ויקרא אותנו לכפור בו יתעלה - לא נשמע לו, אלא נמסור את עצמנו למות בהחלט; ו[אפילו] לא ניתן לו לחשוב שכפרנו, אף שלבנו מאמין בו יתעלה.

וזו היא מצוות קדוש השם שנצטוו בה כל בני ישראל, כלומר: שנמסור את עצמנו למות בידי העריץ על אהבתו יתעלה והאמונה בייחודו, כמו שעשו חנניה מישאל ועזריה בימי נבוכדנצר הרשע כשהכריח להשתחוות לצלם, והשתחוו כל בני אדם וישראל בכללם, ולא היה שם מקדש שם שמים. והיה בכך חרפה גדולה לישראל שאבדה מכולם מצווה זו, ולא היה שם מי שמקיים אותה אלא הכל פחדו.

ואין מצווה זו נוהגת אלא בכגון אותו המעמד העצום שבו פחדו כל באי העולם, והיה חובה לפרסם ייחודו ולהכריז עליו באותה העת. וכבר הבטיח ה' על ידי ישעיהו, שלא תהיה חרפת ישראל גמורה באותו המעמד, ושיופיעו בהם בחורים באותו המעמד הקשה, שלא ירתיעם המות, ויפקירו דמם ויפרסמו את האמונה ויקדשו את ה' ברבים, כמו שציוונו יתעלה על ידי משה רבנו, והוא אמרו:

"לא עתה יבוש יעקב ולא עתה פניו יחורו. כי בראותו ילדיו מעשה ידי בקרבו יקדישו שמי והקדישו את קדוש יעקב ואת אלקי ישראל יעריצו" (ישעיה כט, כב-כג).

Hagyan said...

> Kiddush Hashem seems to be a highly specialized case, not an illustration of a simple case of Mitzva identification. Why do you use that as the example?

Sorry I wasn't explicit. I didn't mention it qua "illustration of a simple case of Mitzva identification"; I cited it qua the declarative sentence it is.

(A separate subject: Qua מצווה it doesn't seem to me to be a "highly specialized case": in the first instance, I think it is presented as governing the type of relationship we pursue with our כוהנים. This is one viable "approach" to finding the sentence's מצווה-imperativeness.)

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Sorry I wasn't explicit. I didn't mention it qua "illustration of a simple case of Mitzva identification"; I cited it qua the declarative sentence it is.

Can you spell out what the "meaning" of
"ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל"
is, in the sense of "meaning" that of "a reaction of soul that an ordinary citizen can detect in himself"?

Hagyan said...

RS: Can you spell out what the "meaning" of
"ונקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל"
is, in the sense of "meaning" that of "a reaction of soul that an ordinary citizen can detect in himself"?

Consider another statement which is near in meaning and grammatically equivalent: All 'ordinary [Jewish] citizens' will come to possess קידוש השם הגדול [*] as a 'self-evident rational imperative-experience'. Do you see the obstacles to "spelling-out the meaning" of that statement?

-----
[*] Or, alternatively, שביתה בשביעי ממלאכה, or ...

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Consider another statement which is near in meaning and grammatically equivalent: All 'ordinary [Jewish] citizens' will come to possess קידוש השם הגדול [*] as a 'self-evident rational imperative-experience'.

Point #1
As Rambam explains it(see afer point #2), this pasuk illustrates a Mitzva that all citizens understand. The specific case Rambam brings of the time of
חנניה מישאל ועזריה בימי נבוכדנצר הרשע
does not seem to illustrate a self evident rational thought to me.

Point #2
Such an understanding as you speak of would be one that only a reader of MN would have- a "talmud torah al tzad haemet". Clearly such a one has already read the Torah and the MT including the pasuk vinikdashti with notions other than self evident ones, this being called "talmud torah" without hyphenation.

It is these notions preliminary notions of talmud torah, prior to MN that Ralbag uses as well in his explanation of Mitzva.


וזו היא מצוות קדוש השם שנצטוו בה כל בני ישראל, כלומר: שנמסור את עצמנו למות בידי העריץ על אהבתו יתעלה והאמונה בייחודו, כמו שעשו חנניה מישאל ועזריה בימי נבוכדנצר הרשע כשהכריח להשתחוות לצלם, והשתחוו כל בני אדם וישראל בכללם, ולא היה שם מקדש שם שמים. והיה בכך חרפה גדולה לישראל שאבדה מכולם מצווה זו, ולא היה שם מי שמקיים אותה אלא הכל פחדו.

ואין מצווה זו נוהגת אלא בכגון אותו המעמד העצום שבו פחדו כל באי העולם, והיה חובה לפרסם ייחודו ולהכריז עליו באותה העת. וכבר הבטיח ה' על ידי ישעיהו, שלא תהיה חרפת ישראל גמורה באותו המעמד, ושיופיעו בהם בחורים באותו המעמד הקשה, שלא ירתיעם המות, ויפקירו דמם ויפרסמו את האמונה ויקדשו את ה' ברבים, כמו שציוונו יתעלה על ידי משה רבנו, והוא אמרו:

Hagyan said...

I've highlighted some of your expressions in bold face. My reactions pertain to those expressions.

RS: Point #1: As Rambam explains it(see afer point #2), this pasuk illustrates a Mitzva that all citizens understand. ...

I don't think I referred to this notion. I don't read it in the רמב"ם you cited, either. I strove to exclude that notion from my expression "come to possess קידוש השם הגדול as a 'self-evident rational imperative-experience'". I refer to something that's accessible to a craftsman, qua craftsman, whose knowings correspond to narrative accounts, as in this hypothetical disagreement between a housebuilder (H) and his customer (C). C: "Can't you space the studs twice as far apart?! I can't afford all that expensive lumber!" H: "You can't do that!! The wall will fall down!!"

RS: [Point #1 cont.] ... The specific case Rambam brings of the time of
חנניה מישאל ועזריה בימי נבוכדנצר הרשע
does not seem to illustrate a self evident rational thought to me.

Ditto, if your notion here connotes more than 'narrative account'. We find that different polities find different narrative accounts of political phenomena to be credible. (In contrast, Oppenheimer and Heisenberg had highly-commensurable discourses about nuclear fission in 1944.)

RS: Point #2: Such an understanding as you speak of would be one that only a reader of MN would have- a "talmud torah al tzad haemet". ...

Ditto.

RS: [Point #2 cont.] ... Clearly such a one has already read the Torah and the MT including the pasuk vinikdashti with notions other than self evident ones, this being called "talmud torah" without hyphenation. ...

I'm lost here. Maybe ditto?

RS: ... It is these notions preliminary notions of talmud torah, prior to MN that Ralbag uses as well in his explanation of Mitzva. [followed by an excerpt from ספר המצוות]

Lost here, too.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Is what Rambam refers to as a mekubal in the Milot hahigayon an example of a 'self-evident rational imperative-experience'"?

Hagyan said...

I've never studied that work. Nowhere more so than in ancient logic would I hesitate to interpret a text hastily.

In the terminology I've been using here, not all 'self-evident rational experiences' are 'imperative', just as not all narrative accounts are about things I ought do.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

I will attempt to answer your original question

How does the Ralbag System read a meaning of logical type מצווה from שמות כ/ט?

in upcoming posts as best I can.

David Guttmann said...

Basically Ralbag is transforming the negative commandment into a positive making it into an a-priori rather than just refraining from doing something. I guess this allows for Simch in kiyum hamitzvah even in a Lo Ta'asseh.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Basically Ralbag is transforming the negative commandment into a positive

Why bother?

making it into an a-priori rather than just refraining from doing something.

Explain Jargon please?

I guess this allows for Simch in kiyum hamitzvah even in a Lo Ta'asseh.

What is the basis for saying Shabbat is about Simcha?

David Guttmann said...

שהשמחה שישמח אדם בעשיית המצוות ובאהבת האל שציווה בהן, עבודה גדולה היא; וכל המונע עצמו משמחה זו, ראוי להיפרע ממנו, שנאמר "תחת, אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלוהיך, בשמחה, ובטוב לבב" (דברים כח,מז). וכל המגיס דעתו, וחולק כבוד לעצמו, ומתכבד בעיניו במקומות אלו--חוטא, ושוטה. ועל זה הזהיר שלמה, ואמר "אל תתהדר, לפני מלך"

i read this for ALL mitzvot.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

David

I hear what you are saying. I think it is better to explain Shvita based on its immediate character of kedusha (Zachor et Yom Ha-Shabbat Likadisho), rather than a feature shared by all Mitzvot generically- Simcha.

Hagyan said...

Is "logical type mitzva" the sort of reaction of soul that an ordinary citizen can identify in himself? [emphasis added]

'Ordinary' by nature? Or 'ordinary' by political situatedness -- e.g., by the kind of שבת his polis institutes?

שבת שלום.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

HAGYAN

I am speaking of an ordinary citizen in a polis that is aware of the ikrim of Rambam as stated in Chelek, though it may be at a very low level of awareness.

Hagyan said...

... a polis that is aware of the ikrim of Rambam as stated in Chelek ...

In the (few) cases I have studied it seems to me that the suchness of political institutions dominates in the forming of citizens' דעת (the "bottom line" of govering); something approximately like the late Marshall McLuhan's notion that "the medium is the message". If this is true, then the dominating causality would be the institution-shapers' "aware[ness] of the ikrim" (your term) becoming reified in the suchness of the institutions.

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

I am only speaking of my own personal experience of a polis with awareness of the Ikrim in Chelek.

As I have seen it, this Talmud Torah awareness penetrated the institution of Talmud Torah, more so than the behavioral institution of the mitzvot as in the case of Shabbat.

Hagyan said...

R.JS: "I am only speaking of my own personal experience of a polis with awareness of the Ikrim in Chelek."

Is their approach unilateral or multilateral?

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

What would "unilateral or multilateral" mean in this context?

Hagyan said...

Just 4 minutes to ponder the משלים (hyperlinked)?!

Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

These terms, multi and unilateral, are usually used in context of directing sovereign power to a chosen mission. Often this mission has to do with issues of life and death. Both your examples are life and death issues.

Are you asking if the community I speak of has sovereign power in this sense?

Hagyan said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Rabbi Jonathan Sacks said...

Hagyan's comment

R.JS: "These terms, multi and unilateral, are usually used in context of directing sovereign power to a chosen mission. Often this mission has to do with issues of life and death. Both your examples are life and death issues."

I hadn't thought of that. It's seemed to me that grasping the life-or-death significance of שבת for the polis is within the first ordered insight that the רמב"ם identifies in the subject:

ספר זמנים חלק א,
הלכות שבת פרק א,
הלכה א

שביתה בשביעי ממלאכה--מצות עשה, שנאמר "וביום השביעי תשבות" (שמות כג,יב; שמות לד,כא). וכל העושה בו מלאכה, ביטל מצות עשה, ועבר על לא תעשה, שנאמר "לא תעשה כל מלאכה" (שמות כ,ט; דברים ה,יג). ומה הוא חייב על עשיית מלאכה--אם עשה ברצונו בזדון, חייב כרת, ואם היו שם עדים והתראה, נסקל; ואם עשה בשגגה, חייב קרבן חטאת קבועה.

I commented earlier: "... the dominating causality [of the עיקרים 'penetrating behavioral institutions' like שבת] would be the institution-shapers' 'awareness of the עיקרים' becoming reified in the suchness of the institutions." [Italics indicate your terms.] The institution-shapers' grasp of the life-or-death significance of שבת for the polis would be reified in the suchness of the שבת they institute. (This article I read yesterday nicely captures some of the suchness of life-and-death awareness.)

R.JS: "Are you asking if the community I speak of has sovereign power in this sense?"

No, not exactly. More nearly: Is the polis self-sufficient with respect to the challenge? Do other poleis face the same challenge? Etc. Perhaps it's relevant, however, that poleis typically claim "sovereignty" when they judge that their standing, prerogatives, etc., might be diminished by multilateral action.