In your earlier question Matt, you asked regarding :כאילו עומד לפני השכינה
1) Is it ki'ilu because tefilah is, in a sense, artificial? In order to be mispaleil, a person must first yifnei libo mi'kol ha'machshavos. In other words, he must withdraw from the associated world of his own pursuits and see himself in light of the shem Hashem.
2) Also, what is the mashal of lifnei?
In my answer to you regarding "כאילו עומד לפני השכינה" I posted a mashal of the Rambam. I would like to develop that Mashal a little further for you, drawing out the two issues that you raised, 1)withdrawing from the associated world and 2)being "lifnei ha-shechina".
A king is in his palace, and all his subjects are partly in the country, and partly abroad. Of the former, some have their backs turned towards the king's palace, and their faces in another direction; and some are desirous and zealous to go to the palace, seeking "to inquire in his temple", and to minister before him, but have not yet seen even the face of the wall of the house.
Matt, in your question you speak of the difficulty for a person to withdraw from their associated Machshavos. In the Mashal this difficult withdrawal is portrayed through clarifying the sense of "place". The palace is certainly a place in the sense of location- a circumscribed area in material space, yet this sense hardly captures the essence of a palace as the seat of sovereignty. The location of the palace is instrumental to a higher purpose, a relationship with the person of the sovereign. The choice to situate oneself in this place is reflective of the level of maturity in the subjects relationship with the sovereign.
In essence the sovereign can be viewed in two frameworks: 1) as an inspiration of mind and judgment for the intellectual community 2) as source of power for the practical community. It is in the selection of the principle by which to conceive of sovereignty that the maturity of the subject is measured and his choice of placement relative to the palace will be determined.
The immature subject lives in his own world, the associated world you speak of Matt. The interests here are highly provincial, purely practical in focus and utterly disconnected from the mind- policy and strategic vision of the sovereign. For example, the military policy of the sovereign is viewed as an exercise of power, a local opportunity to make money assembling a weapons system, a boon to the economy. This in turn has its meaning as Joe, John and Sally making raises, needed steps toward buying a dream house or a new TV. While the location of the immature subject is certainly circumscribed, his immaturity does not lie in the small town location in which his body is to be found. It is rather in his smallness of mind, preoccupation with the power to buy his dream house and his tv as the ultimate organizing principle of his world that is the source of the immaturity. It is this principle which causes the face of such a person to turn away with disinterest from the palace.
The more mature subject has intellectual interests that cause him to relate to the intellectual activity underlying the exercise of power. This subject relates to the sovereign as a mind, not a power. They gravitate toward the decision making area, like Mordechai or Daniel. They seek to "inquire in the temple", to participate in the stimulating intellectual life behind the policy-the mind trust, the intellectual community surrounding the king. The desire to be in the place of the king, indicates the subjects identity as a mind yearning for intellectual relationship to the king.
The Rambam of course, uses this mashal for a deeper purpose as well. The thinker is in many ways similar to the subject of the king. The framework in which his identity is forged will similarly depend upon the thinkers view of sovereignty or causality. Let us take the example of Newton. Like the subjects of the king, Chochmas Hashem can be related to provincially, or in a more mature way. Awareness of "gravity" as a force- the cause of motion in the material world can be viewed as an end in its own right. The value could be in getting a PHD, perhaps extending the idea gravity to a spaceships orbit, the idea of DNA to a useful drug. This view leads to a provincial identity and a distinterest in seeking the sovereign on his own terms as mind, interest focusing instead on taking the sovereign as a source of power. The immature thinker wants the same sorts of things as an immature subject. As the subject directs the military policy of the king to practical concerns, so too the immature thinker directs the gift of mind to practical ends, he lacks interest in shifting his focus to a higher plane. His interest in thought is limited to the daled amos of his physical self- the provincial associated world of dream house and TV.
The more mature thinker however, is curious beyond his provincial world. His interest in gravity is deeper, going to the phenomenon of mind itself. His primary interest is not in the sovereign's power, in application of the principle of gravity to attain greater power of possession. Rather he wonders about the sovereign as source of mind. He is interested in the ultimate application of gravity to be sure, but his interests move beyond the provincial material world itself. His mind grapples with the world of ideas. What is the meaning of the idea of gravity arising in his mind? What is the cause of the human mind moving from potential knowing to actual knowing? What is the relation of the idea of gravity to a material planet in motion. How can a planet without mind be moved by an intellectual principle. It is this interest in causality per se which shakes this thinker from the comfort zone of explaining his provincial expression of idea as a source of motion.
Friday, November 28, 2008
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
Matt lifnei Hashem
RS,
Thank you for the explanation.
I remember you pointing out that the requirement of kavana is not to be omeid lifnei ha'shechinah but to be ki'ilu omeid lifnei ha'shechinah, but I don't remember the idea.
Is it ki'ilu because tefilah is, in a sense, artificial? In order to be mispaleil, a person must first yifnei libo mi'kol ha'machshavos. In other words, he must withdraw from the associated world of his own pursuits and see himself in light of the shem Hashem.
Also, what is the mashal of lifnei?
Thank you for the question Matt.
The כאילו is indeed because of the artificiality of T'fillah you speak of. The default state of machshava, a state we never really separate from, is the obstacle. We lack the kedusha, the actuality of mind, needed to truly experience Shechina directly. Such direct experience would be Chochmas Hashem as it is, ממציא כל נמצא not as a force of Geula that is ממציא us as Bnei Yisrael.
Insofar as the Mashal of Lifnei consider Rambam Moreh Nevuchim part III Chapter LI
Thank you for the explanation.
I remember you pointing out that the requirement of kavana is not to be omeid lifnei ha'shechinah but to be ki'ilu omeid lifnei ha'shechinah, but I don't remember the idea.
Is it ki'ilu because tefilah is, in a sense, artificial? In order to be mispaleil, a person must first yifnei libo mi'kol ha'machshavos. In other words, he must withdraw from the associated world of his own pursuits and see himself in light of the shem Hashem.
Also, what is the mashal of lifnei?
אֶשָּׂא עֵינַי, אֶל-הֶהָרִים-- מֵאַיִן, יָבֹא עֶזְרִי ?
עֶזְרִי, מֵעִם יְהוָה-- עֹשֵׂה, שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ
The כאילו is indeed because of the artificiality of T'fillah you speak of. The default state of machshava, a state we never really separate from, is the obstacle. We lack the kedusha, the actuality of mind, needed to truly experience Shechina directly. Such direct experience would be Chochmas Hashem as it is, ממציא כל נמצא not as a force of Geula that is ממציא us as Bnei Yisrael.
Insofar as the Mashal of Lifnei consider Rambam Moreh Nevuchim part III Chapter LI
I will begin the subject of this chapter with a simile. A king is in his palace, and all his subjects are partly in the country, and partly abroad. Of the former, some have their backs turned towards the king's palace, and their faces in another direction; and some are desirous and zealous to go to the palace, seeking "to inquire in his temple," and to minister before him, but have not yet seen even the face of the wall of the house. Of those that desire to go to the palace, some reach it, and go round about in search of the entrance gate; others have passed through the gate, and walk about in the ante-chamber; and others have succeeded in entering into the inner part of the palace, and being in the same room with the king in the royal palace. But even the latter do not immediately on entering the palace see the king, or speak to him; for, after having entered the inner part of the palace, another effort is required before they can stand before the king--at a distance, or close by--hear his words, or speak to him. I will now explain the simile which I have made. The people who are abroad are all those that have no religion, neither one based on speculation nor one received by tradition. Such are the extreme Turks that wander about in the north, the Kushites who live in the south, and those in our country who are like these. I consider these as irrational beings, and not as human beings; they are below mankind, but above monkeys, since they have the form and shape of man, and a mental faculty above that of the monkey.
Those who are in the country, but have their backs turned towards the king's palace, are those who possess religion, belief, and thought, but happen to hold false doctrines, which they either adopted in consequence of great mistakes made in their own speculations, or received from others who misled them. Because of these doctrines they recede more and more from the royal palace the more they seem to proceed. These are worse than the first class, and under certain circumstances it may become necessary to day them, and to extirpate their doctrines, in order that others should not be misled.
Those who desire to arrive at the palace, and to enter it, but have never yet seen it, are the mass of religious people; the multitude that observe the divine commandments, but are ignorant. Those who arrive at the palace, but go round about it, are those who devote themselves exclusively to the study of the practical law; they believe traditionally in true principles of faith, and learn the practical worship of God, but are not trained in philosophical treatment of the principles of the Law, and do not endeavour to
establish the truth of their faith by proof. Those who undertake to investigate the principles of religion, have come into the ante-chamber; and there is no doubt that these can also be divided into different grades. But those who have succeeded in finding a proof for everything that can be proved, who have a true knowledge of God, so far as a true knowledge can be attained, and are near the truth, wherever an approach to the truth is possible, they have reached the goal, and are in the palace in which the king lives.
My son, so long as you are engaged in studying the Mathematical Sciences and Logic, you belong to those who go round about the palace in search of the gate. Thus our Sages figuratively use the phrase: "Ben-zoma is still outside." When you understand Physics, you have entered the hall; and when, after completing the study of Natural Philosophy, you master Metaphysics, you have entered the innermost court, and are with the king in the same palace.
Monday, November 24, 2008
Shechina
Matt sent me the following email:
The question I wanted to ask you is: What is shechinah? Specifically, what does the Rambam mean by the requirement of "ki'ilu omeid lifnei ha'shechinah" in hilchos tefilah?
The question I wanted to ask you is: What is shechinah? Specifically, what does the Rambam mean by the requirement of "ki'ilu omeid lifnei ha'shechinah" in hilchos tefilah?
I remember discussing this idea during the summer. I also remember it having something to do with chochmas Hashem as an organizing force in society. I also remember your analogy to the Renaissance. But that's about it. Any help would be much appreciated.
Yes Matt, Shechina is Chochmas Hashem as known by man in a way that it creates a living dynamic mesorah in thought and action. This is known generally as the idea of a "paradigm" the insight of a great man that illuminates the community. Einsteins thought created the community chochma experience of Physics. PHD students guide their intuition for research via this illuminating thought. They depend upon Einsteins thought for a sense of what "thinking" and "thought" and "lawful universe" are.
In that sense Einstein enabled shechina, a state of relationship of mind to the world of idea, to have concrete meaning as a phenomenon and end we can organize our lives around. It is for this reason we think of Shechina resting in the camp. The "camp" is the community mind. In a dark age the wisdom of the wise is lost, therefore our connection to Shechina is obscured and the value of our research wanes becoming mere scholastic pedantry. It is for this reason I compared Shechina to the renaissance, a time when scholasticism ended and a new dynamic mesorah of chochma was born.
Please ask questions so we can clarify this further.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Reposting of Ralbag al Hatorah for Jake
Chochma as Sovereign force realizing two products through Hashgacha:
a. thought in minds b. order in matter
Blessed and most revered be the tzur ("rock"), foundation of all existence, whose “insight” (T'vunaso) , “wisdom” (chochmaso) and “knowledge” (Daato) bring into being, a system of existing things, whose existence exhibits a wisdom and grace which none but He can completely apprehend. Praised be the Creator, who, because of His desire to benefit the creations and facilitate their maturation, directed His hashgacha upon these lowly beings, developing them through the appropriate stages climaxing with the emergence of Mankind.
Hashgacha realizes thought and order in Rational animal
This hashgacha is not limited to the magnificence of man’s anatomy and physical abilities by which his physical existence is maintained. It extends to guiding man along the path of mental development- the one true fruit of human existence for whose sake alone the lowly material of Aretz is endowed with tzura to the extent that it is. We refer of course to the divine Torah, which is a regimen that orders those who practice it properly to true success.
Zechira: Torah education does not remove our dependency on Hashgacha
It is vital that we keep in mind that it is impossible for us to completely apprehend the wisdom and grace expressed in the nature of the Torah’s existence. In reality we know but a pittance and are ignorant of much, as is the case with our knowledge of the nature of all existing things with regard to their wisdom and grace. In reality we masig but very little, as is well known to all those who do real research in the natural sciences- and come to appreciate the gap between our models of the of the laws of the Universe and their reality... It therefore follows from the fact that the Torah is divine, [that it’s nature will also only be incompletely understood].
The three stages of Torah development
Insofar as the objective of the Torah is the one we have just outlined, its topics will, of necessity, be divisible into the following elements:
Stage 1 practical: life of 613 Mitzvot
The first element, mistakenly thought of by many as the entire mission of the Torah, are the Mitzvos which encompass what we have been commanded to believe and do as well as what not to believe or do. This category includes 613 Mitzvos according to the traditional method of counting.
Stage 2 theoretical mitzvot as social science
The second element encompasses the study of political behavior and society generally. This area is a domain outside of legislative action, because it presupposes a level of human development well beyond the capacity of the standard citizen. To illustrate, let us consider if the Torah were to legislate in the following that we must not be angry except for what one ideally should be angry about, and even then only to the ideal measure of anger, in the proper time and place. Or perhaps that one should not be happy except for what one ideally should be happy about, and even then only to the ideal measure of happiness, in the proper time and place…. All people would be in violation of the law continuously, excluding a minute few. Excellences of this variety should not be the domain of legislation, as it will lead to people ignoring all law, even those laws they could have fulfilled. Therefore the Torah merely makes reference to this area of excellence through accounts of the way of the ancient masters, to guide us to walk in their path and conduct ourselves like them. So too have we been informed of certain evils that were done in order to avoid such behavior as well.
Stage 3 theoretical mitzvot as universal science
The third element includes what the Torah grants us of the Wisdom of the universe, that cannot be attained through human research, save by exhaustive effort, when man fails to avail himself of its prophetic stories that guide us to this hasaga (apprehension).
Place of Ralbag in mesorah
These very same elements comprise the field of Talmud as well, with the one difference being that its stories are not prophetic, but rather are based upon the accounts of great men renowned for their excellence.
It is of necessity that the Torah regimen should be divided into these elements, since human excellence can only be fully realized, except by attaining excellence of both man's constitution and research to the most excellent degree. Now the part of Torah that encompasses the study of political /social affairs that is beyond command and prohibition, constitutes a further step toward the ultimate excellence that builds upon that already attained by mitzvot in the domain of developing man's physical constitution. The part of Torah that deals with extremely difficult Philosophical scientific ideas constitutes a further step toward the ultimate excellence that builds upon that already attained by mitzvot in the domain of developing man's intellectual soul.
Adapting the Mitzvot method to the current scientific practice
לפי שאיננו מחויב במה שנעלם מן הקודמים שיעלם מן הבאים אחריהם, כי הזמן מספיק בהוצאת האמת, כמו שאמר הפלוסוף בשני מספר השמע, ולולא זה לא נמצא איש חוקר בחכמות מהחכמות אם לא במה שלמדם מזולתו. ואם הונח הענין כן, לא היתה בכאן חכמה כלל
We decided to present certain fundamental principles based upon authority in this introduction, even though they have been theoretically established in the various fields. This was done because had we introduced all of the needed premises to reduce these fundamentals to first principles, this treatise would become too long, and the reader would be overwhelmed.
Now in our biur of the Mitzvos, and the fundamental principles from which all the dinim are derived in the field of Talmud, our approach will not be to associate these principles to the exemplars pointed to by the chachmei ha-talmud utilizing the 13 midos methodology. This is because when they associated these known truths of the field of mitzvot to these pesukim, it was as a mnemonic device, not because their method demanded that they were truly source material to these dinim. Indeed, it is possible to overturn all the known laws of the torah utilizing such methodologies, even to the point of falsely demonstrating the [ultimately tamei] sheretz to be tahor as our Rabbis have taught us.
Rather [our approach will be] to associate the [biur of the Mitzvos, and the fundamental principles from which all the dinim are derived] to the simple grammatical meanings of the pesukim that could have possibly been real sources for these laws, because this will satisfy the mind. This approach does not contradict Chazal's method, because they never meant to imply that their mnemonic devices were the true source of the laws- but rather they received these laws through tradition going back to Moshe Rabbenu. They merely sought to find a hint [for the dinim] in the Torah as Maimonides taught us in the Sefer ha-mitzvot and the Perush ha-Mishna.
Our objective in associating the dinim to the simple grammatical meanings is to retain their memory traces in our Nefesh, since the Pesukim are easily remembered because we are constantly reading them. Therefore when the biurei ha- Mitzvot are derived from the simple grammatical meanings of the Pesukim, our memory of them will secondarily perpetuate the memory of the biurei ha-Mitzvot as well. It was for this very same reason that we gave the causes of the Mitzvot as best we could, because not only does knowing the causes of a thing consolidate knowledge, it also consolidates our memory of the knowledge.
It is of course vital to remember, that it is impossible in [the kind of topics the Torah deals with] to give causes that allow a derivation of the Mitzvot, in the manner of a Mathematical proof. Neither is it possible to show necessity as in the case of a physical law. This would be impossible to do since it is not in the nature of the Torah subject to allow this kind of proof. This point was already pointed out by the Philosopher in the book of Topics. He pointed out in that work that the rigor of proof possible for a given principle, is delimited by the nature of the subject. This was also explained in Metaphysics. We mentioned this, so that the scrutinizing reader should not be dismissive of the kind of causes we offer in the explanation of the Mitzvot, even if they do not measure up to the proofs characteristic of the sciences whose subjects are by nature able to sustain more rigorous standards than the topics the Torah deals with.
We will now present the M'komot that we will use in the Biurei ha-Mitzvot:
The first Makom [Topos]:
The Torah cites a particular in place of a universal. This divides into two kinds:
The first kind:
When the particular case mentioned in a mitzva illustrates the general principle.
For example, we are commanded in the Torah (D'varim 22:10) that we may not plow with an ox and a donkey together. The Torah cites "ox" and "donkey" in place of any two species - one being tamei and the other tahor; "plowing" is cited in place of any craft that would employ a tahor animal with one that is tamei, as is explained in the eight chapter of K'laim and other places throughout the Talmud.
It will be clear when to learn from the particular the general and when not, from the subject matter of the mitzva and the words that are employed - as will become clear to you from our discussion, when we utilize this makom. For example, the subject matter of this mitzva demands this law apply in the case of other animals - meaning to say, that they should not be joined in one craft, one being tamei and the other tahor, as will be explained there, with God's decree.
The Second Type of the First Makom
The second type:
It is learned from a law that is cited in regard to one particular mitzva, a law that rightly should have more general application to another mitzva - to the same degree as it should be applied to the original mitzva or even more so.
For example, the Torah cites the law (Vayikra 7:15; 22:30) concerning the time the todah offering - which is kodshim kalim - may be eaten - namely, for the period of a day and night and henceforth it is notar and must be burnt. Concerning the time kodshei haKodashim - like the chatat, asham and the rest - may be eaten the Torah is silent. This is because this law should rightly be applied to them the same as it is applied to the todah, or even more so. Therefore, the law concerning the time kodshei haKodashim may be eaten is the same as the law that applies to the todah, as is explained in the fifth chapter of Z'vachim (36A). The philosopher has explained this makom in the rhetorical topics.
The second Makom:
When one statement in the Torah is obscure - its explanation is not known - and this statement is elucidated in another place the explanation of this statement is learned from the other place in which it is elucidated.
For example, the Torah demands a chatat (sin offering) from one who accidently does one of the commandments of God that we are forbidden from doing, or an asham (guilt offering) from one who was ignorant of his violation, as is explained in Parashat Vayikra. It is not clear in this place in the Torah which commandments in the Torah are being referred to here.
The explanation of this statement is learned from what is written in the parallel verses in Parashat Sh'lach L'kha. There it is written (B'midbar 15:24), "If, from the eyes of the aida (congregation) it is done accidentally", just as it is written in Parashat Vayikra (Vayikra 4:13), "And the matter is hidden from the eyes of the kahal (congregation) and they do one of the commandments of God (that one may not do)...". There [in B'midbar] it is found that the tzibbur (congregation) must bring a bull [as an olah (elevation-offering)] just as is required here [in the case in Parashat Vayikra], although there [in B'midbar] a he-goat is added [as a chatat (sin offering)]; there [in B'midbar (15:27)] an individual would be required to bring a she-goat, in its first year [as a chatat (sin offering)] just as here [in Vayikra 4:28; 4:32] a she-goat or a sheep must be brought [as a chatat (sin offering)].
Based on this, we learn that the mitzvot this korban [the one in Parashat Vayikra] is brought for are of the same kind as the mitzva cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha - there is no difference between them - only, the one cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha is equal to all the mitzvot: idolatry. However, the mitzvot cited in Parashat Vayikra would have no equality to "all the mitzvot". This is what is meant when it is written in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha (15:22), "...all of these mitzvot...", and in Parashat Vayikra (4:13), "...one of the mitzvot of God...". It is impossible to say that what is mean when it is says, "all these mitzvot" that only if one accidentally violates all the mitzvot is he required to bring a bull and a he-goat because one is required, based on what is written in Parashat Vayikra to bring a bull on every single mitzva that is violated accidentally.
Now that this has been established, it will be evident that just as the particular that is cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha is only in regard to transgressions that if done intentionally would make the perpetrator liable to karet - as is made evident there when it says (B'midbar 15:30-31), "And the soul that act with an uplifted hand... that soul shall surely be cut off (h'karet t'karet), his iniquity is upon him." - so to that which is cited in Parashat Vayikra is a case in which intentional violation would make the perpetrator liable to karet, as is elucidated in Horiot and K'ritot.
a. thought in minds b. order in matter
Blessed and most revered be the tzur ("rock"), foundation of all existence, whose “insight” (T'vunaso) , “wisdom” (chochmaso) and “knowledge” (Daato) bring into being, a system of existing things, whose existence exhibits a wisdom and grace which none but He can completely apprehend. Praised be the Creator, who, because of His desire to benefit the creations and facilitate their maturation, directed His hashgacha upon these lowly beings, developing them through the appropriate stages climaxing with the emergence of Mankind.
Hashgacha realizes thought and order in Rational animal
This hashgacha is not limited to the magnificence of man’s anatomy and physical abilities by which his physical existence is maintained. It extends to guiding man along the path of mental development- the one true fruit of human existence for whose sake alone the lowly material of Aretz is endowed with tzura to the extent that it is. We refer of course to the divine Torah, which is a regimen that orders those who practice it properly to true success.
Zechira: Torah education does not remove our dependency on Hashgacha
It is vital that we keep in mind that it is impossible for us to completely apprehend the wisdom and grace expressed in the nature of the Torah’s existence. In reality we know but a pittance and are ignorant of much, as is the case with our knowledge of the nature of all existing things with regard to their wisdom and grace. In reality we masig but very little, as is well known to all those who do real research in the natural sciences- and come to appreciate the gap between our models of the of the laws of the Universe and their reality... It therefore follows from the fact that the Torah is divine, [that it’s nature will also only be incompletely understood].
The three stages of Torah development
Insofar as the objective of the Torah is the one we have just outlined, its topics will, of necessity, be divisible into the following elements:
Stage 1 practical: life of 613 Mitzvot
The first element, mistakenly thought of by many as the entire mission of the Torah, are the Mitzvos which encompass what we have been commanded to believe and do as well as what not to believe or do. This category includes 613 Mitzvos according to the traditional method of counting.
Stage 2 theoretical mitzvot as social science
The second element encompasses the study of political behavior and society generally. This area is a domain outside of legislative action, because it presupposes a level of human development well beyond the capacity of the standard citizen. To illustrate, let us consider if the Torah were to legislate in the following that we must not be angry except for what one ideally should be angry about, and even then only to the ideal measure of anger, in the proper time and place. Or perhaps that one should not be happy except for what one ideally should be happy about, and even then only to the ideal measure of happiness, in the proper time and place…. All people would be in violation of the law continuously, excluding a minute few. Excellences of this variety should not be the domain of legislation, as it will lead to people ignoring all law, even those laws they could have fulfilled. Therefore the Torah merely makes reference to this area of excellence through accounts of the way of the ancient masters, to guide us to walk in their path and conduct ourselves like them. So too have we been informed of certain evils that were done in order to avoid such behavior as well.
Stage 3 theoretical mitzvot as universal science
The third element includes what the Torah grants us of the Wisdom of the universe, that cannot be attained through human research, save by exhaustive effort, when man fails to avail himself of its prophetic stories that guide us to this hasaga (apprehension).
Place of Ralbag in mesorah
These very same elements comprise the field of Talmud as well, with the one difference being that its stories are not prophetic, but rather are based upon the accounts of great men renowned for their excellence.
It is of necessity that the Torah regimen should be divided into these elements, since human excellence can only be fully realized, except by attaining excellence of both man's constitution and research to the most excellent degree. Now the part of Torah that encompasses the study of political /social affairs that is beyond command and prohibition, constitutes a further step toward the ultimate excellence that builds upon that already attained by mitzvot in the domain of developing man's physical constitution. The part of Torah that deals with extremely difficult Philosophical scientific ideas constitutes a further step toward the ultimate excellence that builds upon that already attained by mitzvot in the domain of developing man's intellectual soul.
Adapting the Mitzvot method to the current scientific practice
לפי שאיננו מחויב במה שנעלם מן הקודמים שיעלם מן הבאים אחריהם, כי הזמן מספיק בהוצאת האמת, כמו שאמר הפלוסוף בשני מספר השמע, ולולא זה לא נמצא איש חוקר בחכמות מהחכמות אם לא במה שלמדם מזולתו. ואם הונח הענין כן, לא היתה בכאן חכמה כלל
We decided to present certain fundamental principles based upon authority in this introduction, even though they have been theoretically established in the various fields. This was done because had we introduced all of the needed premises to reduce these fundamentals to first principles, this treatise would become too long, and the reader would be overwhelmed.
Now in our biur of the Mitzvos, and the fundamental principles from which all the dinim are derived in the field of Talmud, our approach will not be to associate these principles to the exemplars pointed to by the chachmei ha-talmud utilizing the 13 midos methodology. This is because when they associated these known truths of the field of mitzvot to these pesukim, it was as a mnemonic device, not because their method demanded that they were truly source material to these dinim. Indeed, it is possible to overturn all the known laws of the torah utilizing such methodologies, even to the point of falsely demonstrating the [ultimately tamei] sheretz to be tahor as our Rabbis have taught us.
Rather [our approach will be] to associate the [biur of the Mitzvos, and the fundamental principles from which all the dinim are derived] to the simple grammatical meanings of the pesukim that could have possibly been real sources for these laws, because this will satisfy the mind. This approach does not contradict Chazal's method, because they never meant to imply that their mnemonic devices were the true source of the laws- but rather they received these laws through tradition going back to Moshe Rabbenu. They merely sought to find a hint [for the dinim] in the Torah as Maimonides taught us in the Sefer ha-mitzvot and the Perush ha-Mishna.
Our objective in associating the dinim to the simple grammatical meanings is to retain their memory traces in our Nefesh, since the Pesukim are easily remembered because we are constantly reading them. Therefore when the biurei ha- Mitzvot are derived from the simple grammatical meanings of the Pesukim, our memory of them will secondarily perpetuate the memory of the biurei ha-Mitzvot as well. It was for this very same reason that we gave the causes of the Mitzvot as best we could, because not only does knowing the causes of a thing consolidate knowledge, it also consolidates our memory of the knowledge.
It is of course vital to remember, that it is impossible in [the kind of topics the Torah deals with] to give causes that allow a derivation of the Mitzvot, in the manner of a Mathematical proof. Neither is it possible to show necessity as in the case of a physical law. This would be impossible to do since it is not in the nature of the Torah subject to allow this kind of proof. This point was already pointed out by the Philosopher in the book of Topics. He pointed out in that work that the rigor of proof possible for a given principle, is delimited by the nature of the subject. This was also explained in Metaphysics. We mentioned this, so that the scrutinizing reader should not be dismissive of the kind of causes we offer in the explanation of the Mitzvot, even if they do not measure up to the proofs characteristic of the sciences whose subjects are by nature able to sustain more rigorous standards than the topics the Torah deals with.
We will now present the M'komot that we will use in the Biurei ha-Mitzvot:
The first Makom [Topos]:
The Torah cites a particular in place of a universal. This divides into two kinds:
The first kind:
When the particular case mentioned in a mitzva illustrates the general principle.
For example, we are commanded in the Torah (D'varim 22:10) that we may not plow with an ox and a donkey together. The Torah cites "ox" and "donkey" in place of any two species - one being tamei and the other tahor; "plowing" is cited in place of any craft that would employ a tahor animal with one that is tamei, as is explained in the eight chapter of K'laim and other places throughout the Talmud.
It will be clear when to learn from the particular the general and when not, from the subject matter of the mitzva and the words that are employed - as will become clear to you from our discussion, when we utilize this makom. For example, the subject matter of this mitzva demands this law apply in the case of other animals - meaning to say, that they should not be joined in one craft, one being tamei and the other tahor, as will be explained there, with God's decree.
The Second Type of the First Makom
The second type:
It is learned from a law that is cited in regard to one particular mitzva, a law that rightly should have more general application to another mitzva - to the same degree as it should be applied to the original mitzva or even more so.
For example, the Torah cites the law (Vayikra 7:15; 22:30) concerning the time the todah offering - which is kodshim kalim - may be eaten - namely, for the period of a day and night and henceforth it is notar and must be burnt. Concerning the time kodshei haKodashim - like the chatat, asham and the rest - may be eaten the Torah is silent. This is because this law should rightly be applied to them the same as it is applied to the todah, or even more so. Therefore, the law concerning the time kodshei haKodashim may be eaten is the same as the law that applies to the todah, as is explained in the fifth chapter of Z'vachim (36A). The philosopher has explained this makom in the rhetorical topics.
The second Makom:
When one statement in the Torah is obscure - its explanation is not known - and this statement is elucidated in another place the explanation of this statement is learned from the other place in which it is elucidated.
For example, the Torah demands a chatat (sin offering) from one who accidently does one of the commandments of God that we are forbidden from doing, or an asham (guilt offering) from one who was ignorant of his violation, as is explained in Parashat Vayikra. It is not clear in this place in the Torah which commandments in the Torah are being referred to here.
The explanation of this statement is learned from what is written in the parallel verses in Parashat Sh'lach L'kha. There it is written (B'midbar 15:24), "If, from the eyes of the aida (congregation) it is done accidentally", just as it is written in Parashat Vayikra (Vayikra 4:13), "And the matter is hidden from the eyes of the kahal (congregation) and they do one of the commandments of God (that one may not do)...". There [in B'midbar] it is found that the tzibbur (congregation) must bring a bull [as an olah (elevation-offering)] just as is required here [in the case in Parashat Vayikra], although there [in B'midbar] a he-goat is added [as a chatat (sin offering)]; there [in B'midbar (15:27)] an individual would be required to bring a she-goat, in its first year [as a chatat (sin offering)] just as here [in Vayikra 4:28; 4:32] a she-goat or a sheep must be brought [as a chatat (sin offering)].
Based on this, we learn that the mitzvot this korban [the one in Parashat Vayikra] is brought for are of the same kind as the mitzva cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha - there is no difference between them - only, the one cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha is equal to all the mitzvot: idolatry. However, the mitzvot cited in Parashat Vayikra would have no equality to "all the mitzvot". This is what is meant when it is written in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha (15:22), "...all of these mitzvot...", and in Parashat Vayikra (4:13), "...one of the mitzvot of God...". It is impossible to say that what is mean when it is says, "all these mitzvot" that only if one accidentally violates all the mitzvot is he required to bring a bull and a he-goat because one is required, based on what is written in Parashat Vayikra to bring a bull on every single mitzva that is violated accidentally.
Now that this has been established, it will be evident that just as the particular that is cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha is only in regard to transgressions that if done intentionally would make the perpetrator liable to karet - as is made evident there when it says (B'midbar 15:30-31), "And the soul that act with an uplifted hand... that soul shall surely be cut off (h'karet t'karet), his iniquity is upon him." - so to that which is cited in Parashat Vayikra is a case in which intentional violation would make the perpetrator liable to karet, as is elucidated in Horiot and K'ritot.
Path to Mitzvot III
Ya'akob ibn Avi Mori said...
Rebbi,
How would you suggest we go about using the RaLbaG to this end, would you suggest we start from Bereishith or would you suggest an alternate direction from which to use the RaLbaG to approach the Mikrah?
Jake
אֶשָּׂא עֵינַי, אֶל-הֶהָרִים-- מֵאַיִן, יָבֹא עֶזְרִי ?
עֶזְרִי, מֵעִם יְהוָה-- עֹשֵׂה, שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ
Dear Jake
I didn't realize you were learning with Jonny- I'm really glad to hear it. Regarding limud bictav, it depends on your interest.
I certainly don't mean to say that you should stop learning Mitzvot in the way that you are doing. It is actually important to continue because that is what you are interested in. I just mean you will find it very helpful to also get premises from the early stories till Sinai.
I would certainly recommend that you try to chart the major stages of the path from Creation to Sinai. It will reveal a lot about the nature of Mitzvos. You would find Ralbag's intro to Chumash very helpful in this regard. The Hebrew is pretty hard until you get used to it, but I have translated it on this blog. Take a look at the post Yakov wrote about Noach as an example of just how many important premises for later Mitzvos a guy learning in this way of charting the development of mankind until Sinai can get. This is the way to gain help from the story of Creation of Shamayim Vaaretz.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Path to Mitzvot II
Jonny said...
The Mitzvot are principles of acting as mind. To act as a mind requires one to understand oneself in proper relationship to one's environment.
This involves,first of all understanding mans relation to Hashem as part of the absolute environment of Shamayim vaaretz. It then involves understanding mans relation to Hashem as part of the immediate environment of daled amot. Within daled amos there are many sub relationships man to field and tree.Man to territory and home. Man to animal. Man to man. Man to parent. These are are all areas in which we must learn to see the principles of human action.
These principles are seen first in a general simplified form embedded in the stories of Bichtav. Think of Lo Tachrosh. While we had an understanding of the mitzva, we did not learn its halachic details. We learned what could be seen via its context of bichtav. In similar fashion a simplified understanding of Peru U'rvu is embedded in Creation.A simplified understanding of Berit Milah is embedded with Avraham Avinu etc.
This first simplified baal peh involved in identifying the Mitzvot and their simple applications is done by Ralbag. There is a more advanced form of seeing the applications of Mitzvot to all cases- this is Rambam. Read my "why Rambam" on the bottom of my blog. I go into this issue there as well.
My understanding was that Mishneh Torah is a book of Torah Shebaal Peh, which is this study of how to actually do mitzvos-- what the mitzvos are and how to do them. Torah Shebechtav on the other hand is the educational manual to learn the framework in which the mitzvos are to be performed.
It seems like I'm not understanding one of these. So what is Torah Shebaal Peh and Torah Shebechtav? And where does the Mishneh Torah fit in?
Or is Ralbag a work of Torah Shebaal Peh in the way that I mean and Mishneh Torah is also but in some other way?
אֶשָּׂא עֵינַי, אֶל-הֶהָרִים-- מֵאַיִן, יָבֹא עֶזְרִי ?
עֶזְרִי, מֵעִם יְהוָה-- עֹשֵׂה, שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ
The Mitzvot are principles of acting as mind. To act as a mind requires one to understand oneself in proper relationship to one's environment.
This involves,first of all understanding mans relation to Hashem as part of the absolute environment of Shamayim vaaretz. It then involves understanding mans relation to Hashem as part of the immediate environment of daled amot. Within daled amos there are many sub relationships man to field and tree.Man to territory and home. Man to animal. Man to man. Man to parent. These are are all areas in which we must learn to see the principles of human action.
These principles are seen first in a general simplified form embedded in the stories of Bichtav. Think of Lo Tachrosh. While we had an understanding of the mitzva, we did not learn its halachic details. We learned what could be seen via its context of bichtav. In similar fashion a simplified understanding of Peru U'rvu is embedded in Creation.A simplified understanding of Berit Milah is embedded with Avraham Avinu etc.
This first simplified baal peh involved in identifying the Mitzvot and their simple applications is done by Ralbag. There is a more advanced form of seeing the applications of Mitzvot to all cases- this is Rambam. Read my "why Rambam" on the bottom of my blog. I go into this issue there as well.
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
Seeking the path to Mitzvos
Hi Rabbi,
So my and Jake's chavrusa on mitzvos just went through a bit of a rough patch. For a while we were just going through definitions and premises so we'd be on the same page. Then we went through lo tacharosh to get a clear idea of what a mitzva looks like when defined in the way we want. Both of those went fine.
But when it came time to choose an area to work on finally, we were having trouble. At first we tried to do shabbos because we had already discussed a basic idea of shabbos in the chaburah last year. But we weren't really feeling the idea, so we tried going to the halachos and the sefer hamitzvos and we realized we really didn't know how to extract an idea from the sources. We tried switching areas to mezuzah and a couple other things, but we kept running into the same blocks.
Our goal was to define the mitzva by isolating a) the area of human life the mitzva governs, b) the psychic animal attitude in that area, c) the correct mindful perspective in that area, d) the action that brings the mitzva-doer from b) to c). But the mishneh torah and the sefer hamitzvos are not so conducive to this. Sefer HaMitzvos more than often just gave a very basic description of the mitzva; like for shabbos, "Mitzva 154 is that we should cease on the shabbos" and then quotes pasukim and tells a couple more details. And many times mishneh torah just starts in with halachos without even a line or two about what the mitzva is. Like with mezuzah, it starts out with how to write a mezuzah. And the particular halachos of measurements and spaces in the mezuzah don't seem too helpful in defining mezuzah as a whole.
Another barrier we had was when trying hakhel, the mitzva seemed to be attached to too many fundamental ideas that we didn't know about. The whole thing was structured around the regalim, the relationship between the king and the am seemed very integral, etc.. Shabbos also we realized how it really has a lot to do with zechiras yetzias mitzrayim, and mezuzah seemed to be a fundamental of zechira mitzvos in general.
In contrast, Lo Tacharosh seemed like a very isolated area where the general idea and categories were very evident. Most other areas seem very connected to huge intimidating fundamentals and its hard to see the ideas or general categories of the halachos amidst the nitty gritty details. So how should we approach these normal areas? If a mitzva is connected to a fundamental area should we try to define that area despite how intimidatingly broad it is? And if there are no statements about the mitzva and rambam just starts with halachos, how do we get the general ideas of the mitzva from that?
And more generally, is it better to try to find the idea from defining and answering questions on the details and particulars or to try to think about the mitzva as a whole? On the one hand, it seems more of a valid scientific approach to let the contradictions in particulars lead us to ideas. In the past it always seems to be some detail that leads us to the definition as a whole. A lot of time, you get nowhere or to very vague general definitions when thinking about general statements about the mitzva. But on the other hand, is it really possible to get the general ideas from such particular particulars? When Rambam is just listing measurements for something, is there an idea there? I noticed in Lo Tacharosh, we gravitated towards the more general halacha of categorizing and stayed away from all the particulars and that led us to the idea. Was that indicative of a method of getting straight the general halachos and using those instead of the particulars?
Sorry to bombard with questions like that, I know its a lot. In the meantime, Jake and I took up bris milah, which has been going well. Thanks for helping us,
Jonny
Dear Jonny,
I remember your mentioning that there was a difficulty with Mitzvos in an earlier email. Your detailed account of these difficulties is very interesting and helpful, not a bombardment at all.
I can't answer these questions individually, rather I will deal with certain fundamentals that the difficulty arises from. You need to remember is that Mitzvot are a relatively advanced form of Torah shebichtav. They take a person from a lifestyle rooted in achzariyut, a worldview centering around supplying the material power of the self, to one of tzedaka a worldview in which supply is to each entity in accord with its nature. Yirah- seeing "man" as a phenomenon with a nature realized in the time and space of daled amos is very difficult, it presupposes many breakthroughs about ourselves and our place in nature. We must learn of a Creation run according to tzedaka, tzedaka to oneself in seeking education, the proper relation of Father to Son, people to animals and vegetation etc.
All of these issues constitute the basis of Mitzvot and are covered in Torah shebichtav prior to Mitzvot. Lo tacharosh is a clear example of this. The proper attitude toward animals is foreshadowed in Bresheet,in the creation of animals and Adam's naming, as well as in Noach, before the mitzva of lo tacharosh ever appears.
My advice would be to allow Torah shebichtav to come to you organically. Certainly, explore Mitzvot, but be aware that there will be many premises that you are missing. These premises are to be found by following the Torah's order of presenting the phenomenon of man from Creation onward. Ralbag is particularly helpful in this regard. You will see that he consistently explains the Torah with this precise end in mind- identifying the premises needed to see man as ready and needing Mitzvot to properly relate to his environment- tzedaka born of Yirah.
אֶשָּׂא עֵינַי, אֶל-הֶהָרִים-- מֵאַיִן, יָבֹא עֶזְרִי ?
עֶזְרִי, מֵעִם יְהוָה-- עֹשֵׂה, שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ
עֶזְרִי, מֵעִם יְהוָה-- עֹשֵׂה, שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ
Dear Jonny,
I remember your mentioning that there was a difficulty with Mitzvos in an earlier email. Your detailed account of these difficulties is very interesting and helpful, not a bombardment at all.
I can't answer these questions individually, rather I will deal with certain fundamentals that the difficulty arises from. You need to remember is that Mitzvot are a relatively advanced form of Torah shebichtav. They take a person from a lifestyle rooted in achzariyut, a worldview centering around supplying the material power of the self, to one of tzedaka a worldview in which supply is to each entity in accord with its nature. Yirah- seeing "man" as a phenomenon with a nature realized in the time and space of daled amos is very difficult, it presupposes many breakthroughs about ourselves and our place in nature. We must learn of a Creation run according to tzedaka, tzedaka to oneself in seeking education, the proper relation of Father to Son, people to animals and vegetation etc.
All of these issues constitute the basis of Mitzvot and are covered in Torah shebichtav prior to Mitzvot. Lo tacharosh is a clear example of this. The proper attitude toward animals is foreshadowed in Bresheet,in the creation of animals and Adam's naming, as well as in Noach, before the mitzva of lo tacharosh ever appears.
My advice would be to allow Torah shebichtav to come to you organically. Certainly, explore Mitzvot, but be aware that there will be many premises that you are missing. These premises are to be found by following the Torah's order of presenting the phenomenon of man from Creation onward. Ralbag is particularly helpful in this regard. You will see that he consistently explains the Torah with this precise end in mind- identifying the premises needed to see man as ready and needing Mitzvot to properly relate to his environment- tzedaka born of Yirah.
Monday, November 17, 2008
theorize about Lulav. Is it not the phenomenon of psychological distortion of seeing a self desiring a thanksgiving being guided to see birkas hashem that is being remedied by Lulav?
Talmud torah seeks real experience through torah shebichtav, it is real about anyman, or at least anyman as I know them. In talmud torah I see what Lulav is as an exploration of how the davar of tov is seen in the special case of harvest, as it applies to man in all times ideal and not through a sort of "case study" of the simcha of a farmer in his harvest. This "case study" should be real, but not necessarily personal. I see the universal mitzva, understand its applications in all times, its full application in times of geula and its limitation in time of galut. This is still not seeing the principle in the world of my own life though.
It is only in doing the mitzva that I reflect upon the principle of tzedaka at harvestime, not as it applies in a "case study" that is real to me but in seeing the principle in the actual real world I myself occupy- a true self application. Though I may even explore the phenomenon of difficulty of everyman doing Lulav in a time of galut, there is still another experience. It is in the self application that I see only in the reality of myself doing the mitzva as part of preserving a system of appreciating the tov of harvestime in my world of October 2008 USA, so remote from its true place in agricultural Israel. The exploration of how the davar of tov of harvestime applies to me in my particular time, in whatever way it does apply,that is the distinct developmental experience of doing of mitzva of lulav.
If so the lack of being farmers, even with a great education system will not make the Mitzvah instruments useful for human development since when Sukkos comes we aren't in the state of happiness which leads us to desire a thanksgiving holidayThe key here lies in understanding the nature of the knowledge to be gotten from reflection upon the principles as embedded in experience. Let us consider Lulav. The davar that is involved here is "tzedaka" - the supply of tov to man. In this the principle is the same as Beracha. Specifically Lulav deals with the tov as it is seen in the case of harvest in Eretz Yisrael. This is because we need to learn to see the principle of tov, not in abstract alone, but as it actually appears to us in the phenomenon of our environment. Harvestime is a very distinct phenomenon, and as such needs its own derech of education. This phenomenon of tov as it appears to us in our environment has two expressions however.
Talmud torah seeks real experience through torah shebichtav, it is real about anyman, or at least anyman as I know them. In talmud torah I see what Lulav is as an exploration of how the davar of tov is seen in the special case of harvest, as it applies to man in all times ideal and not through a sort of "case study" of the simcha of a farmer in his harvest. This "case study" should be real, but not necessarily personal. I see the universal mitzva, understand its applications in all times, its full application in times of geula and its limitation in time of galut. This is still not seeing the principle in the world of my own life though.
It is only in doing the mitzva that I reflect upon the principle of tzedaka at harvestime, not as it applies in a "case study" that is real to me but in seeing the principle in the actual real world I myself occupy- a true self application. Though I may even explore the phenomenon of difficulty of everyman doing Lulav in a time of galut, there is still another experience. It is in the self application that I see only in the reality of myself doing the mitzva as part of preserving a system of appreciating the tov of harvestime in my world of October 2008 USA, so remote from its true place in agricultural Israel. The exploration of how the davar of tov of harvestime applies to me in my particular time, in whatever way it does apply,that is the distinct developmental experience of doing of mitzva of lulav.
Sunday, November 16, 2008
Response to the comment by David Rinde
Hey Rabbi!
Hope all is well, I just wanted to mention that a point you brought up in last week’s shiur really had an impact on me – for some reason I haven’t been able to stop thinking about it. You pointed to the different ways in which a person could engage the mitzvos, as an idolater, or as a Jew on either the mishneh torah or moreh hanevuchim levels. This really struck me, that you could do the mitzvos as an idolater, I mean I knew that but something about just coming out and saying it matter of factly struck me. Could you please describe this way of thinking about and doing mitzvos again?
David Rinde
David
The point I was making was regarding Mitzva as a kind of human action. Ralbag discusses this in the intro to aseres ha-dibros, in comparing a natural Mitzvat Hashem, to an artificial Mitzva born of tyrants. A natural Mitzva must be implementing a benefit within a causal understanding of Creation. Only such an act can be said to be human, a mind's response to perceiving Hashem's tzedaka in Creation.
An idolater does not act on a clear belief in Hashem's tzedaka. As such his Mitzvot are attempts at securing a psychological relationship with a Father figure. These acts are not reflections of understanding of tzedaka / causality, but rather a forgoing of pleasure to demonstrate subservience for its own sake.
One who does Mitzvot without regard for their systemic purpose, their source in tzedaka / causality is therefore acting to promote a fantasy psychological relationship- acting out of the motivation and mindset of an idolater.
Sunday, November 9, 2008
Tzedaka and system version 2
I was in a rush when I wrote this piece, so I have decided to rewrite it since it is important to the next stage of thought. Some of it is copied from the old post, but the overall presentation is entirely new.
Yakov,
Though I have not directly said so, the last few weeks we have been exploring the issue of tzedaka, "justice". Specifically we have seen justice as " הגעת בעל חוק חוקו" supplying every lawful entity in accordance with its law or principle.
In a Creation context, this "justice" is manifest in the divine action of the ecosystem supplying every species with its particular material needs פותח את ידך ומשבע לכל חי
or " צדיק ה בכל דרכיו" . This phenomenon is also known as Midat hadin or by the name Elokim as you have pointed out nicely in your post about Noach. This centrality of ecosystem is also the intent of Rambam in putting the pasuk from tehillim discussing tzedaka at the beginning of ha-Mada.
Yakov, you ask about the Mitzva of Lulav as an antidote to the actual experience of the circumstance of harvest which leads toward the desire for a celebration of human power and material satisfaction – like Thanksgiving. The key to Torah shebichtav, as you mention in your question, is we must see this principle of "tzedaka" or “Shem Hashem”, not only as it applies to the absolute environment of Shamayim and Aretz as seen depicted in the 7 days of Creation, but as it applies to our Daled Amos, the immediate environment of our action- the farm, the city the home etc. How are we to accomplish this experience of tzedaka in our Daled Amos then, if we are not farmers?
To answer this we must be a little more clear on the distinction between seeing principles in the absolute environment of Shamayim Varetz versus seeing them in the immediate environment of our action. If the only valid experience upon which to base reading would be things that actually occur to me, the enterprise of torah shebichtav would be impossible. Indeed, the whole purpose of writing things down is to maintain testimony of events that cannot occur to me. Only Noach could actually experience the of Avoda of an Ish Adama who just went through the destruction of his world. Only Yotzei Mitzraim actually experienced Mitzraim and only the dor ha-Midbar actually experienced the midbar lifestyle. Chayyev Adam liros es atzmo ki'ilu hu yatza mi-mitzraim. The key word here is ki'ilu -as if. The reason is that the need for experience is related to exemplifying principles in our immediate environment. This immediate environment is both most accessible to my senses as well as most interesting as a source of resources. I know a lot about friends because I see them all the time and I enjoy thinking about how to benefit from better friends as well. It is therefore not necessary that the Torah Shebichtav element be seen as an experience that occurs to me personally in my environment for it to be real as an example to me. It is enough that the element be seen as something that happens to people I can identify with as real. Each Torah story is a particularity (פרט ). However, we can relate to each area via understanding, be it the farmer and Noach or Mitzraim and the Midbar. This understanding involves identifying the common thread, the classic human dimension or principle (כלל) embedded within the particularity of the story (פרט). As you recall this detecting of (כלל) embedded within the particularity of the story (פרט) is the first rule of Ralbag in reading Torah shebichtav. It is this recognizing of the particular as an example, mashal or application of the general that allows us to grow in the Mitzva system through experience that is real, but yet not personal to us.
It is also possible for Mitzvot elements of bichtav to be real in this same way. The Mitzva system contains a set of general principles, that will eternally be the core path, a נימוס of Derech Hashem for man moving from achzariyut (lo tachmod) to tzedaka (anochi Hashem). Ralbag identifies these as the Aseres hadibros, the core transformation from lo tachmod to Anochi. Each and every Mitzva in taryag, be it leket and peah or netilas lulav is therefore an extension of these core principles. But it is the core principles alone that are the eternally relevant path, not the extensions, or instruments of application to various material historical circumstance which may not exist at a specific time and place.
It is in light of this that I answered David regarding the Mitzva of Tzedaka. It is entirely possible that as historical circumstances change, some extensions will be more relevant some less. Leket may fade as an extension of tzedaka needed in agricultural times, but the core of tzedaka as an aspect of derech hashem will eternally remain so long as man has any possessions whatsoever.
The case of Lulav is similar to tzedaka in some respects, but not all. It is certainly true that as man becomes less agricultural, the lekicha dimension of lulav may fade in significance relative to naanuim. However, the core reason we cannot relate to lulav does not lie in our technological age. The essence of the problem lies in our almost complete disconnect from the reality of our dependence upon nature. Our fantasy of divine power in this nuclear / Christian age is perhaps more overwhelming than ever before. The dedication of our education to this arrogant fantasy of practical power rather than to the yirah of theoretical interest is similarly singular. The change needed here is one of massive educational reform. What would it take to rededicate science curricula to yira?
The remoteness of our own Jewish mada from systematic organization is a great contributor to this tzara. As Esav rushes in pursuit of his own power, we wallow in an organization of Mitzvot that obscures any similitude to the systematic study of justice of nature at all. we no longer view our mada as speaking about real things of experience at all, a natural outgrowth from th edepiction of natural justice of torah shebichtav, it is almost exclusively a scholastic enterprize. So absolute is this scholasticism that we hardly even know what it means to utilize torah shebichtav as an instrument of finding natural justice in the environment of action. The torah has become a closed book that we do not know how to read. It is this that Rambam decries:
In our times, severe troubles (צרות יתרות) come one after another, and all are in distress; the wisdom of our Torah scholars has disappeared, and the understanding of our discerning men is hidden.
משוך חסדך, ליודעיך; וצדקתך, לישרי לב -תהילים לו,יא
Yakov,
Though I have not directly said so, the last few weeks we have been exploring the issue of tzedaka, "justice". Specifically we have seen justice as " הגעת בעל חוק חוקו" supplying every lawful entity in accordance with its law or principle.
In a Creation context, this "justice" is manifest in the divine action of the ecosystem supplying every species with its particular material needs פותח את ידך ומשבע לכל חי
or " צדיק ה בכל דרכיו" . This phenomenon is also known as Midat hadin or by the name Elokim as you have pointed out nicely in your post about Noach. This centrality of ecosystem is also the intent of Rambam in putting the pasuk from tehillim discussing tzedaka at the beginning of ha-Mada.
Yakov, you ask about the Mitzva of Lulav as an antidote to the actual experience of the circumstance of harvest which leads toward the desire for a celebration of human power and material satisfaction – like Thanksgiving. The key to Torah shebichtav, as you mention in your question, is we must see this principle of "tzedaka" or “Shem Hashem”, not only as it applies to the absolute environment of Shamayim and Aretz as seen depicted in the 7 days of Creation, but as it applies to our Daled Amos, the immediate environment of our action- the farm, the city the home etc. How are we to accomplish this experience of tzedaka in our Daled Amos then, if we are not farmers?
To answer this we must be a little more clear on the distinction between seeing principles in the absolute environment of Shamayim Varetz versus seeing them in the immediate environment of our action. If the only valid experience upon which to base reading would be things that actually occur to me, the enterprise of torah shebichtav would be impossible. Indeed, the whole purpose of writing things down is to maintain testimony of events that cannot occur to me. Only Noach could actually experience the of Avoda of an Ish Adama who just went through the destruction of his world. Only Yotzei Mitzraim actually experienced Mitzraim and only the dor ha-Midbar actually experienced the midbar lifestyle. Chayyev Adam liros es atzmo ki'ilu hu yatza mi-mitzraim. The key word here is ki'ilu -as if. The reason is that the need for experience is related to exemplifying principles in our immediate environment. This immediate environment is both most accessible to my senses as well as most interesting as a source of resources. I know a lot about friends because I see them all the time and I enjoy thinking about how to benefit from better friends as well. It is therefore not necessary that the Torah Shebichtav element be seen as an experience that occurs to me personally in my environment for it to be real as an example to me. It is enough that the element be seen as something that happens to people I can identify with as real. Each Torah story is a particularity (פרט ). However, we can relate to each area via understanding, be it the farmer and Noach or Mitzraim and the Midbar. This understanding involves identifying the common thread, the classic human dimension or principle (כלל) embedded within the particularity of the story (פרט). As you recall this detecting of (כלל) embedded within the particularity of the story (פרט) is the first rule of Ralbag in reading Torah shebichtav. It is this recognizing of the particular as an example, mashal or application of the general that allows us to grow in the Mitzva system through experience that is real, but yet not personal to us.
It is also possible for Mitzvot elements of bichtav to be real in this same way. The Mitzva system contains a set of general principles, that will eternally be the core path, a נימוס of Derech Hashem for man moving from achzariyut (lo tachmod) to tzedaka (anochi Hashem). Ralbag identifies these as the Aseres hadibros, the core transformation from lo tachmod to Anochi. Each and every Mitzva in taryag, be it leket and peah or netilas lulav is therefore an extension of these core principles. But it is the core principles alone that are the eternally relevant path, not the extensions, or instruments of application to various material historical circumstance which may not exist at a specific time and place.
It is in light of this that I answered David regarding the Mitzva of Tzedaka. It is entirely possible that as historical circumstances change, some extensions will be more relevant some less. Leket may fade as an extension of tzedaka needed in agricultural times, but the core of tzedaka as an aspect of derech hashem will eternally remain so long as man has any possessions whatsoever.
The case of Lulav is similar to tzedaka in some respects, but not all. It is certainly true that as man becomes less agricultural, the lekicha dimension of lulav may fade in significance relative to naanuim. However, the core reason we cannot relate to lulav does not lie in our technological age. The essence of the problem lies in our almost complete disconnect from the reality of our dependence upon nature. Our fantasy of divine power in this nuclear / Christian age is perhaps more overwhelming than ever before. The dedication of our education to this arrogant fantasy of practical power rather than to the yirah of theoretical interest is similarly singular. The change needed here is one of massive educational reform. What would it take to rededicate science curricula to yira?
The remoteness of our own Jewish mada from systematic organization is a great contributor to this tzara. As Esav rushes in pursuit of his own power, we wallow in an organization of Mitzvot that obscures any similitude to the systematic study of justice of nature at all. we no longer view our mada as speaking about real things of experience at all, a natural outgrowth from th edepiction of natural justice of torah shebichtav, it is almost exclusively a scholastic enterprize. So absolute is this scholasticism that we hardly even know what it means to utilize torah shebichtav as an instrument of finding natural justice in the environment of action. The torah has become a closed book that we do not know how to read. It is this that Rambam decries:
In our times, severe troubles (צרות יתרות) come one after another, and all are in distress; the wisdom of our Torah scholars has disappeared, and the understanding of our discerning men is hidden.
ואחר שנשלם לי זה העניין, והשתדלתי לעשות הספר ולזכור המצוות כולם זיכרון מוחלט ומספרם בפתיחת הספר, התעוררתי אל השורש שכבר עלה בדעתי זה שנים רבות. והוא במה שמוני המצוות הנה נשתבשו בם רבים בעניינים לא אוכל ספר גודל גנותם.
כי כל מי שהשתדל למנותם, או לחבר ספר בדבר מהכוונה הזאת, נמשכו כולם אחר דברי בעל הלכות גדולות, ולא נטו מכוונתו במספר המצוות כי אם נטייה קטנה. כאילו קפאו הדעות במאמר האיש הזה...
ויודע האל יתברך, ודי בו עדות, כי אני כל מה שהשתכלתי בשיבושם במה שימנו, והיותם מונים מה שנראה בעיון ראשון שאין ראוי למנותו - נמשכו קצתם אחר קצתם בזה, מבלתי עיון - גדל אצלי אסוננו, ונתאמת חיוב ייעודו אשר יעדנו:
"ותהי לכם חזות הכל כדברי הספר החתום,
אשר יתנו אותו אל יודע ספר לאמר קרא נא זה,
ואמר לא אוכל כי חתום הוא" (ישעיהו כט יא
Tzedaka and System
Rabbi,
Does todays discussion contradict what we mentioned last time about the Mitzvah of the 4 Minim? We mentioned that the reason there is a particular action of the Mitzvah is because the farmer has an attraction towards making a thanksgiving. The torah takes that joy and redirects it through the Mitzvah system, particularly Mitzvas Lulav. The Torah could not just tell us that our happiness must be tied to the Shem Hashem since that would not be real to our experience. If so the lack of being farmers, even with a great education system will not make the Mitzvah instruments useful for human development since when Sukkos comes we aren't in the state of happiness which leads us to desire a thanksgiving holiday.
Thanks!
~Yaakov
~Yaakov
Yakov,
Though I have not directly said so, the last few weeks we have been exploring the issue of tzedaka, "justice". Specifically we have seen justice as " הגעת בעל חוק חוקו" supplying every lawful entity in accordance with its law or principle.
In a Creation context, this "justice" is G as manifest through the action of the natural ecosystem supplying every species with its particular material needs פותח את ידך ומשבע לכל חי. Or " צדיק ה בכל דרכיו" otherwise known as Midat hadin or by the name Elokim as you have pointed out nicely in your post about Noach.
The key is we must see this principle of "din" , not only as it applies to the environment of Shamayim and aretz as in the 7 days of Creation, but as it applies to our daled amos, the immediate environment of our action- the farm, the city the home etc.
For this to happen we must identify a specific area in our daled amos, let us say lulav, or the relationship to animals in the case of Noach, and see how it is connected to tzedaka. It is certainly true that the area of lulav is best known to a farmer in Israel who wants a thanksgiving, and the Avoda using animals is best known to Noach, an Ish Adama who just experienced the destruction of his world. In fact each and every story in the Torah is best understood by someone else other than ourselves. Mitzraim is best understood by Yotzei Mitzraim and the Midbar is best understood by dor hamidbar. Each story is a particularity
(פרט ). However, we too can relate to each area via understanding, be it the farmer and Noach or Mitzraim and the Midbar. This understanding involves identifying the common thread, the classic human dimension (כלל) embedded within the particularity of the story (פרט). As you recall this detecting of (כלל) embedded within the particularity of the story (פרט) is the first rule of Ralbag in reading Torah shebichtav.
What we will find is that in each and every entity in our daled amos, the lulav, animals,Midbar and Mitzraim included, are subject to distortion. Specifically this distortion is one of achzariyut, a worldview centering around the supplying the material power of the self, rather than tzedaka a worldview in which supply is to each entity in accord with its nature.
Via the Torah we can retrace each and every entity back to a view proper to tzedaka. As we do this we come to see the Mitzvot in a different light. We see them not as a number of discrete disconnected actions, but as a system of actions, a נימוס directed to a common end. This end as we saw in the dibros is a path from achzariyut (lo tachmod) to tzedaka (anochi Hashem).
In this framework, one realizes that some instruments of tzedaka will be more significant at some times, while others will be more important at other times. The korbanot may be more important at one time, nishalma parim sefataynu, study and prayer about korbanot more important at another time.
Leket may be more important at certain times, matanot lianiyim more important at another. This can be true of aspects of a Mitzva as well. The lekicha may be more important at one time, the naanuim more important at another.
Why then is our time one in which we are disconnected from farming and the idea of thanksgiving? This question is really answered by the Navi in the vision of the vineyard. We are disconnected from the farming precisely because we have refused to use the Torah to see tzedaka as it applies in our daled amot. We prefer to disconnect our daled amot in the pursuit of yitron a fantasy of accomplishment rather than see it as but another supply of tzedaka. I say we because this "decision" is a communal one, not one done by individuals usually. Israel decided to avoid thinking about its vineyard, not individual Israelites.
As you can see this is a keeping of Torah in Tzara, a keeping which keeps coming back to the need for Geula. But isnt this in fact the situation that our Neviim and Baalei Mesorah say we are in? The Navi in the vision of the vineyard is clear, but so is the Rambam.
In our times, severe troubles (צרות יתרות) come one after another, and all are in distress; the wisdom of our Torah scholars has disappeared, and the understanding of our discerning men is hidden. Thus, the commentaries, the responses to questions, and the settled laws that the Geonim wrote, which had once seemed clear, have in our times become hard to understand, so that only a few properly understand them. And one hardly needs to mention the Talmud itself--the Babylonian Talmud, the Jerusalem Talmud, the Sifra, the Sifre, and the Toseftot--which all require a broad mind, a wise soul, and considerable study, before one can correctly know from them what is forbidden or permitted and the other rules of the Torah.
ואחר שנשלם לי זה העניין, והשתדלתי לעשות הספר ולזכור המצוות כולם זיכרון מוחלט ומספרם בפתיחת הספר, התעוררתי אל השורש שכבר עלה בדעתי זה שנים רבות. והוא במה שמוני המצוות הנה נשתבשו בם רבים בעניינים לא אוכל ספר גודל גנותם.
כי כל מי שהשתדל למנותם, או לחבר ספר בדבר מהכוונה הזאת, נמשכו כולם אחר דברי בעל הלכות גדולות, ולא נטו מכוונתו במספר המצוות כי אם נטייה קטנה. כאילו קפאו הדעות במאמר האיש הזה. עד שבעל "ספר המצוות" המפורסם, ראיתי שהרגיש בחלק קטן משיבושי בעל הלכות גדולות, והיה רחוק לדעתו למנות [במניין המצוות] בקור חולים ונחום אבלים, כמו שמנה בעל הלכות. ומה שהרחיק, הוא באמת רחוק, אבל הביא יותר רחוק ממנו, ונמשך אחריו במה שהוא יותר מגונה, כמו שיתבאר למי שיעיין במאמרנו זה.
ויודע האל יתברך, ודי בו עדות, כי אני כל מה שהשתכלתי בשיבושם במה שימנו, והיותם מונים מה שנראה בעיון ראשון שאין ראוי למנותו - נמשכו קצתם אחר קצתם בזה, מבלתי עיון - גדל אצלי אסוננו, ונתאמת חיוב ייעודו אשר יעדנו:
"ותהי לכם חזות הכל כדברי הספר החתום,
אשר יתנו אותו אל יודע ספר לאמר קרא נא זה,
ואמר לא אוכל כי חתום הוא" (ישעיהו כט יא
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
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~Yaakov
Aren't Mitzvot different then stories in that Mitzvot are meant to be experiences in the personal as opposed to relating to experiences of others. We do not say "Chayav adam liros es atzmo k'ilu hu beatzmo natal lulav" Therefore while it is true that Mitzvot are essentially particular expressions of Devarim they also exist as specific instruments which guide one to the fundamentals 'Ledoros'.
November 15, 2008 6:55 PM
This morning it sounded like you were just repeating the same point from last time, let me try phrasing my question a different way.
For us non-farmers is there a difference between talmud torah of the mitzvah culminating in actually performing the mitzvah vs. only being involved in the talmud torah?
November 16, 2008 6:59 PM
Yakov,