Translation of Ralbag's Hakdama

This post is the translation of the Ralbag's Hakdama. Thank you R. Rapoport of yehudathoughts.blogspot.com for the m'kmot translation. Finish the rest soon!! I have a general explanation of the whole hakdama in the next post His Chochma vs Our Chochma.

The two expressions of ohr : Tuvo and Chochmaso Derech
Blessed and most revered be the tzur ("rock"), foundation of all existence, whose “insight” (T'vunaso) , “wisdom” (chochmaso) and “knowledge” (Daato) bring into being, a system of existing things, whose existence exhibits a wisdom and grace which none but He can completely masig. Praised be the Creator, who, because of His desire to benefit the creations and facilitate their maturation, directed His hashgacha upon these lowly beings, developing them through the appropriate stages climaxing with the emergence of Mankind.

This hashgacha is not limited to the magnificence of man’s anatomy and physical abilities by which his physical existence is maintained. It extends to guiding man along the path of mental development- the one true fruit of human existence for whose sake alone the lowly material of Aretz is endowed with tzura to the extent that it is. We refer of course to the divine Torah, which is a regimen that orders those who practice it properly to true success. Biur d'varim #1

The End of Torah is determined by the Soul's process of hasaga
It is vital that we keep in mind that it is impossible for us to completely apprehend the wisdom and grace expressed in the nature of the Torah’s existence. In reality we know but a pittance and are ignorant of much, as is the case with our knowledge of the nature of all existing things with regard to their wisdom and grace. In reality we masig but very little, as is well known to all those who do real research in the natural sciences- and come to appreciate the gap between our models of the of the laws of the Universe and their reality... It therefore follows from the fact that the Torah is divine, [that it’s nature will also only be incompletely understood]. Biur d'varim #2

Insofar as the objective of the Torah is the one we have just outlined, its topics will, of necessity, be divisible into the following elements:

A) The first element, mistakenly thought of by many as the entire mission of the Torah, are the Mitzvos which encompass what we have been commanded to believe and do as well as what not to believe or do. This category includes 613 Mitzvos according to the traditional method of counting.

B) The second element encompasses the study of political behavior and society generally. This area is a domain outside of legislative action, because it presupposes a level of human development well beyond the capacity of the standard citizen. To illustrate, let us consider if the Torah were to legislate in the following that we must not be angry except for what one ideally should be angry about, and even then only to the ideal measure of anger, in the proper time and place. Or perhaps that one should not be happy except for what one ideally should be happy about, and even then only to the ideal measure of happiness, in the proper time and place…. All people would be in violation of the law continuously, excluding a minute few. Excellences of this variety should not be the domain of legislation, as it will lead to people ignoring all law, even those laws they could have fulfilled. Therefore the Torah merely makes reference to this area of excellence through accounts of the way of the ancient masters, to guide us to walk in their path and conduct ourselves like them. So too have we been informed of certain evils that were done in order to avoid such behavior as well.

C) The third element includes what the Torah grants us of the Wisdom of the universe, that cannot be attained through human research, save by exhaustive effort, when man fails to avail himself of its prophetic stories that guide us to this hasaga (apprehension).

These very same elements comprise the field of Talmud as well, with the one difference being that its stories are not prophetic, but rather are based upon the accounts of great men renowned for their excellence.

It is of necessity that the Torah regimen should be divided into these elements, since human excellence can only be fully realized, except by attaining excellence of both man's constitution and research to the most excellent degree. Now the element that encompasses the study of political behavior, constitutes a further step toward the ultimate excellence that builds upon that already attained by mitzvot in the domain of developing man's physical constitution. The element that teaches political /social affairs that is beyond command and prohibition, constitutes a further step toward the ultimate excellence that builds upon that already attained by mitzvot in the domain of developing man's psychological constitution... Biur d'varim #3

We decided to present certain fundamental principles based upon authority in this introduction, even though they have been theoretically established in the various fields. This was done because had we introduced all of the needed premises to reduce these fundamentals to first principles, this treatise would become too long, and the reader would be overwhelmed.

Now in our biur of the Mitzvos, and the fundamental principles from which all the dinim are derived in the field of Talmud, our approach will not be to associate these principles to the exemplars pointed to by the chachmei ha-talmud utilizing the 13 midos methodology. This is because when they associated these known truths of the field of mitzvot to these pesukim, it was as a mnemonic device, not because their method demanded that they were truly source material to these dinim. Indeed, it is possible to overturn all the known laws of the torah utilizing such methodologies, even to the point of falsely demonstrating the [ultimately tamei] sheretz to be tahor as our Rabbis have taught us. Biur d'varim #4

Rather [our approach will be] to associate the [biur of the Mitzvos, and the fundamental principles from which all the dinim are derived] to the simple grammatical meanings of the pesukim that could have possibly been real sources for these laws, because this will satisfy the mind. This approach does not contradict Chazal's method, because they never meant to imply that their mnemonic devices were the true source of the laws- but rather they received these laws through tradition going back to Moshe Rabbenu. They merely sought to find a hint [for the dinim] in the Torah as Maimonides taught us in the Sefer ha-mitzvot and the Perush ha-Mishna.

Our objective in associating the dinim to the simple grammatical meanings is to retain their memory traces in our Nefesh, since the Pesukim are easily remembered because we are constantly reading them. Therefore when the biurei ha- Mitzvot are derived from the simple grammatical meanings of the Pesukim, our memory of them will secondarily perpetuate the memory of the biurei ha-Mitzvot as well. It was for this very same reason that we gave the causes of the Mitzvot as best we could, because not only does knowing the causes of a thing consolidate knowledge, it also consolidates our memory of the knowledge. Biur d'varim #5

It is of course vital to remember, that it is impossible in [the kind of topics the Torah deals with] to give causes that allow a derivation of the Mitzvot, in the manner of a Mathematical proof. Neither is it possible to show necessity as in the case of a physical law. This would be impossible to do since it is not in the nature of the Torah subject to allow this kind of proof. This point was already pointed out by the Philosopher in the book of Topics. He pointed out in that work that the rigor of proof possible for a given principle, is delimited by the nature of the subject. This was also explained in Metaphysics. We mentioned this, so that the scrutinizing reader should not be dismissive of the kind of causes we offer in the explanation of the Mitzvot, even if they do not measure up to the proofs characteristic of the sciences whose subjects are by nature able to sustain more rigorous standards than the topics the Torah deals with. Biur d'varim #6

We will now present the M'komot that we will use in the Biurei ha-Mitzvot:

The First Makom

The first Makom [Topos]:
The Torah will cite a particular in place of the general. There are two types:

The first type:
From the particular mentioned in a mitzva the more general category is learned.

For example, we are commanded in the Torah (D'varim 22:10) that we may not plow with an ox and a donkey together. The Torah cites "ox" and "donkey" in place of any two species - one being tamei and the other tahor; "plowing" is cited in place of any craft that would employ a tahor animal with one that is tamei, as is explained in the eight chapter of K'laim and other places throughout the Talmud.

It will be clear when to learn from the particular the general and when not, from the subject matter of the mitzva and the words that are employed - as will become clear to you from our discussion, when we utilize this makom. For example, the subject matter of this mitzva demands this law apply in the case of other animals - meaning to say, that they should not be joined in one craft, one being tamei and the other tahor, as will be explained there, with God's decree.

The Second Type of the First Makom

The second type:
It is learned from a law that is cited in regard to one particular mitzva, a law that rightly should have more general application to another mitzva - to the same degree as it should be applied to the original mitzva or even more so.

For example, the Torah cites the law (Vayikra 7:15; 22:30) concerning the time the todah offering - which is kodshim kalim - may be eaten - namely, for the period of a day and night and henceforth it is notar and must be burnt. Concerning the time kodshei haKodashim - like the chatat, asham and the rest - may be eaten the Torah is silent. This is because this law should rightly be applied to them the same as it is applied to the todah, or even more so. Therefore, the law concerning the time kodshei haKodashim may be eaten is the same as the law that applies to the todah, as is explained in the fifth chapter of Z'vachim (36A). The philosopher has explained this makom in the rhetorical topics.

The second Makom:

When one statement in the Torah is obscure - its explanation is not known - and this statement is elucidated in another place the explanation of this statement is learned from the other place in which it is elucidated.

For example, the Torah demands a chatat (sin offering) from one who accidently does one of the commandments of God that we are forbidden from doing, or an asham (guilt offering) from one who was ignorant of his violation, as is explained in Parashat Vayikra. It is not clear in this place in the Torah which commandments in the Torah are being referred to here.

The explanation of this statement is learned from what is written in the parallel verses in Parashat Sh'lach L'kha. There it is written (B'midbar 15:24), "If, from the eyes of the aida (congregation) it is done accidentally", just as it is written in Parashat Vayikra (Vayikra 4:13), "And the matter is hidden from the eyes of the kahal (congregation) and they do one of the commandments of God (that one may not do)...". There [in B'midbar] it is found that the tzibbur (congregation) must bring a bull [as an olah (elevation-offering)] just as is required here [in the case in Parashat Vayikra], although there [in B'midbar] a he-goat is added [as a chatat (sin offering)]; there [in B'midbar (15:27)] an individual would be required to bring a she-goat, in its first year [as a chatat (sin offering)] just as here [in Vayikra 4:28; 4:32] a she-goat or a sheep must be brought [as a chatat (sin offering)].

Based on this, we learn that the mitzvot this korban [the one in Parashat Vayikra] is brought for are of the same kind as the mitzva cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha - there is no difference between them - only, the one cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha is equal to all the mitzvot: idolatry. However, the mitzvot cited in Parashat Vayikra would have no equality to "all the mitzvot". This is what is meant when it is written in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha (15:22), "...all of these mitzvot...", and in Parashat Vayikra (4:13), "...one of the mitzvot of God...". It is impossible to say that what is mean when it is says, "all these mitzvot" that only if one accidentally violates all the mitzvot is he required to bring a bull and a he-goat because one is required, based on what is written in Parashat Vayikra to bring a bull on every single mitzva that is violated accidentally.

Now that this has been established, it will be evident that just as the particular that is cited in Parashat Sh'lach L'cha is only in regard to transgressions that if done intentionally would make the perpetrator liable to karet - as is made evident there when it says (B'midbar 15:30-31), "And the soul that act with an uplifted hand... that soul shall surely be cut off (h'karet t'karet), his iniquity is upon him." - so to that which is cited in Parashat Vayikra is a case in which intentional violation would make the perpetrator liable to karet, as is elucidated in Horiot and K'ritot.